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The role of ideology in the Polish political debate over the 2015 migration crisis

Introduction

The goal of this article is to identify the impact of ideological assumptions on the political debate in Poland concerning the 2015 European migration crisis, which was the consequence of military conflicts and socio-economic destabilisation in countries of the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the search for better living conditions by, among others, citizens of the Balkan states. The apogee of the crisis in Europe took place in 2015, in which a total of 1,822,337 illegal border crossings of the EU took place, in comparison with 282, 962 in 2014 (Frontex 2016: 63). The number of those applying for the first time for international protection in EU member states as well as Norway and Switzerland in that year reached 1,324,215, compared to 595,530 in 2014 (European Asylum Support Office 2016: 128). During the ongoing situation in 2015, the EU decided to set in motion a mechanism of relocation and resettlement by European countries, with assigned numbers of people seeking international protection, which particular countries, including Poland, were obligated to accept. The Polish government, headed by Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz from the Civic Platform party (Platforma Obywatelska Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej, hereinafter PO) agreed to Polish participation in this process (which meant accepting a total of 7,082 individuals). However, in November 2015, after parliamentary elections, power was assumed by a new government headed by Prime Minister Beata Szydło from the Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, hereinafter PiS) which from the very beginning had been decidedly opposed to any Polish participation in the relocation and resettlement mechanism. The political line of this government was continued by the government of Mateusz Morawiecki (PiS), who became prime minister in December of 2017. On 13 October

2019 parliamentary elections took place, which were again won by PiS and the mission of creating a new government was entrusted once more to Mateusz Morawiecki. Although Poland did not accept a single person within the framework of the relocation and resettlement mechanism, this issue became the topic of a disagreement in Polish political debate lasting several years. The parliamentary debate on 16 September 2015 concerning the migration crisis had no precedent in the Polish Sejm. It was at that time that the main axis of the disagreement defining the political debate was clearly outlined for subsequent years.

In this article, it is assumed that within the statements made by all sides of the debate there were judgements that were either explicitly or implicitly conditioned by ideology. In the popular understanding, the concept of ideology seems relatively easy to understand. However, defining it in theoretical and methodological terms poses a certain intellectual challenge. As Andrew Heywood states, ideology is one of the most controversial concepts found in political science analysis (Heywood 2002: 52). Franciszek Ryszka, in turn, writes that the term 'ideology' appears in the social sciences with a few dozen different meanings (Ryszka 1984: 160). Undoubtedly, this concept needs to be more precisely conceptualised and operationalised. In the simplest sense, the concept of ideology can be understood as "an ordered set (system) of values and goals assigned to large communities, which justifies political actions, and which takes precedence over the individual views and attitudes of its followers" (ibidem: 189).

In the remainder of this article, a little more space is devoted to theoretical and methodological considerations related to this concept. Although many nuanced positions can be distinguished in disputes related to the migration crisis, this article adopts a dichotomous division (that is into supporters and opponents of Polish participation in the relocation mechanism proposed in 2015). The author was induced to such a simplification by the fact that the dispute over the Polish position on the EU policy regarding the migration crisis was part of a broader ideological polarisation of public debate in Poland. (cf. Piekot 2016: 68).

This analysis is intended to answer the following research questions:

1. what overt or covert ideological assumptions were present in statements made by politicians, both proponents and opponents of Polish participation in the implementation of the 2015 relocation and resettlement mechanism?
2. to what extent did the ideological beliefs manifested by participants in the dispute risk presenting a falsified (distorted) picture of reality?

3. in what ways did public participants in political discourse attempt to impose their ideological beliefs on public opinion and their political opponents?

The main method used in the study was qualitative discourse analysis based on the semiotic mediation (see below for details). The next part of the article attempts to conceptualise the category of “ideology”. Then, the operationalisation of this concept is discussed, and the methodology and research procedures used are described in detail. The key element of the article is the presentation of the results of my own empirical research along with the interpretation of the messages presented. The material subjected to empirical analysis was the record of the aforementioned parliamentary debate of 16 September 2015. The article ends with conclusions, including a proposal for theoretical and practical applications resulting from the research conducted.

The conceptualisation of ideology in political debate

In the aforementioned definition of ideology formulated by F. Ryszka, particular attention should be paid to three elements that distinguish this concept from the idea of a worldview or a system of values. The first element is the fact that the concept of ideology applies to value systems shared by large communities. Developing the aforementioned thread in order to specify the meaning of the term “ideology”, it can be concluded that ideologies are those systems of values and goals that are related to the sense of social identity of their supporters. In other words, supporters of a given ideology not only adopt a system of values, beliefs and goals that make up their individual identities, but also take into account their social functioning in this context. To apply the category of ideology, this system must be closely related to the sense of social identity, and sometimes also the cultural identity of its supporters. Hence, ideologies imply more or less polarised divisions into “us” and “them”, and can also arouse strong emotions among both their supporters and opponents.

Another element of the definition of ideology is the fact that ideology provides a justification for political action. These goals and values are considered so important that they translate into the pursuit of power in the state and the implementation of ideological assumptions in political activities (through doctrines, programs, decision making and other political activities). In certain situations, political goals may take precedence over ideology, which does not change the fact that certain ideological assumptions are used in an instrumen-

tal way to justify these goals. Finally, ideologies take precedence over individual views and attitudes, that is the latter become secondary to a certain pre-imposed system of values and goals.

While further developing the above considerations, it should be noted that ideology also includes rules of conduct in the sphere of political relations (Antoszewski, Herbut 2002: 134), in which ideology refers not only to the moral, but also the “intellectual basis of collective political action” (ibid.). It is worth noting that various theorists have drawn attention to the dysfunctional impact of ideology on both the political process and society at large. For example, in the Marxist understanding of ideology, it inherently includes falsehood, misdirection and deception (ibid.). According to Karl Marx, ideology serves to camouflage the real intentions for maintaining inequality (Heywood 2008: 21). On the other hand, in the conservative perspective expressed by M. Oakeshott, ideologies are “abstract ‘systems of thought’: that is, [...] sets of ideas that distort political reality” (Heywood 2002: 43). M. Oakeshott defines ideology as a complex set of related ideas (Oakeshott 1999: 64), a system of abstract ideas (ibid.: 70) or a set of related abstract principles (ibid.: 64) that are thought out in advance (ibid.). In this understanding of the term, the function of ideology is the provision of knowledge or a way of understanding the principle political issues, whereby this knowledge and understanding are primary to the empiricism they set in motion. M. Oakeshott, however, assumes that ideology is the result of reflection upon an existing form of politics or political activity, and in this sense, it does not precede the political process as such, that is some form of political activity precedes ideology. The author in question assumes that ideologies are hidden in experience, that is they result from experience, and then, on their basis, ideas or knowledge regarding future experiences are formulated in advance (ibid.: 64-69). In simple terms, future political experiences are interpreted through a prism of preconceived ideological assumptions, which in turn have emerged from previous political experiences. According to M. Oakeshott, political activity cannot begin with ideological activity (ibid.: 71). Robert A. Dahl and Bruce Stinebrickner recognise that among the reasons for the development of ideology by political leaders is the desire to endow their leadership with authority and legitimacy that enable the most economic form of influence in a regular and lasting manner (Dahl, Stinebrickner 2007: 101). This fact points to the aforementioned threat of the instrumental use of ideology by politicians who only appear to identify with it.

Ideologies have greater or lesser tendencies to impose specific views and ways of formulating them in the broader public space. Actions undertaken for

the dominance of a particular ideology in the public sphere may take the form of forcing a specific 'political correctness', prohibiting the expression of 'incorrect' views (cf. Heywood 2009: 15) or the selection of specific semantic means or topics of public debate (cf. Łotocki 2019: 77- 81). In addition, ideologies in larger communities function on the basis of specific "packages of beliefs", with such a package consciously or more or less thoughtlessly accepted *en bloc* by the supporters of a given ideology. Negating a single belief that makes up such a package could pose a threat to the social identity of a supporter of a particular ideology, including violating the order of division into "us" and "them". Since every ideology is burdened with a greater or lesser risk of simplifying and distorting the adherents' perception of reality, there is a negative perception of "ideologizing" in the public discourse, which stands in opposition to knowledge, science, or simply reliable and factual judgment.

In the context of the identity-based and collective nature of ideology, it is worth mentioning the concept of groupthink. This can occur in strongly cohesive groups, and such groups include communities based upon common ideological assumptions, especially those organised politically. This syndrome consists of the following mechanisms: a sense of infallibility, unanimity, inviolability and security, the stereotyping of opponents, the stigmatisation of deviants, a selective approach toward information, self-censorship of individuals, a greater tendency to ignore risk, the radicalisation of assessments, actions and decisions as well as the perception of group cohesion and good relationships within a group as being more important than the quality of situational assessments, actions or decisions (cf. Morreale, Spitzberg, Barge 2007: 447-450; Tyszka 2010: 282-284; Aronson, Wilson, Akert 1997: 379-386).

Ideological convictions affect the public dissemination of certain judgments, both in terms of content and formal structure. In political debate, they create a risk of politicians taking a "no holds barred" approach, which paves the way for manipulation and political Machiavellianism, as well as consciously or unconsciously reducing the complexity of the socio-political reality or distorting its perception. At the same time, ideological factors are an inherent and natural element of political life, including political debate. Political debate should be understood here as an organised public discussion in which various kinds of players participate and in which various positions are outlined and contrasted, influenced, among other factors, by ideology. This discussion is oriented towards making a political decision, even if no decision is ultimately made (cf. Golinowska, Morecka, Nieciuński et al. 2000: 228-229). The subjects of political debate are contentious issues that are important to the general public (cf. Kampka 2014: 11).

Research methodology

The main tool of political debate is the language used. A. Heywood even claimed that politics is "conducted through the medium of language" (Heywood 2004: 3), and in this context language is not simply a means of communication, but is a political weapon (*ibid.*). F. Ryszka, in turn, maintains that politics is first expressed in words, and even that "the word 'creates' (...) politics, it is a way of doing politics" (Ryszka 1984: 38), and not merely a tool of communication (*ibid.*). The most appropriate method of identifying elements of ideology in the language used by politicians is discourse analysis (*cf.* Lisowska-Magdziarz 2009: 379; Mikołajczyk 2014: 409-410). This method is interpretive and focuses on extracting explicit and hidden mental models from linguistic messages (such as those of politicians) (*cf.* Mrozowski 2003: 188), as well as attempts to impose specific ideological assumptions. The most blatant indicator of ideologization in language use is phraseology. As J. Bralczyk writes, "through phraseology we recognise affiliation or the deliberate identification of people" (Bralczyk 2004: 78). Elsewhere, he states: "in order for an ideology to function fully, it must have a shaped variety of language, the specificity of which is most clearly revealed through phraseological phenomena" (Bralczyk 2003: 58). The subject of discourse analysis, apart from phraseology itself, may also be the denotations and connotations of the words used, but also, more broadly, the strategies utilised for naming people, objects and phenomena, making judgments about them and drawing conclusions (*topoi*), the intensification or suppression of specific content or "framing" ("perspectivisation") or contextualisation) of the topics discussed (*cf.* Wodak 2001: 73). In the study presented here, the analysis of the main threads of the messages formulated by the two parties to the dispute and the phraseology used is aimed at identifying "mental models" that make up specific ideological assumptions. The interpretive nature of the method raises the risk of the researcher's subjectivity having an excessive influence when interpreting the linguistic messages studied. A certain way of dealing with this problem is to refer to the approach referred to by Tomasz Piekot as "semiotic mediation" (Piekot 2016). In this approach, it is crucial to change the direction of the researcher's involvement (point of view) when analysing the statements of discourse participants, depending on what ideology they identify with. As T. Piekot states, the concept of mediation is understood as "an action of a third party (here: a researcher) involved in facilitating mutual understanding and communication between the parties, without taking a position and supporting the selected party" (*ibid.*: 21).

In this article, this “mediation” is a look at each linguistic message analysed, both from the perspective of a supporter and an opponent of a particular judgement (message). Then, an attempt is made to interpret the message in order to identify the impact of potential ideological factors on its content and form. Interpretation is carried out simultaneously from different points of view. The ideological factors identified in this process had to be characterised by properties described in the conceptualisation of ideology discussed earlier. The analysed positions and messages are treated here as conflicting “discursively equal points of view” (ibid.: 23) conditioned, among other ways, ideologically. The point is to take the point of view of each side and try to identify the ideological factors in the most objective way possible. As T. Piekot states in relation to the described approach, “the discursive image of any phenomenon consists of various ideological variants (discursive profiles)” (ibid.: 25) and these “ideological variants” are the subject of the analysis performed here. It is worth noting that ideologies determine both the way messages are formulated and the way they are read (understood) (cf. ibid.: 32).

The subject of analysis was a transcript of the main parliamentary debate on the response of the Polish state to the migration crisis. The debate, which took place on 16 September 2015, has already been the subject of research in a broader context (see, for example, Adamczyk 2016; Bielecka-Prus 2016; Łotocki 2019). In contrast to already existing analyses, this study treats it as a source of linguistic messages that allow for the most objective extraction of the ideological assumptions that guided the main parties in the dispute over Polish participation in the implementation of the relocation mechanism.

The analysis was limited to three main themes around which the disagreement was centred. These are the humanitarian imperative, the security imperative and the imperative of European solidarity. The research procedure consisted of the following stages:

1. the identification and selection of messages related to the main threads;
2. the interpretation of selected messages from the perspective of the participants in the political debate who identify with a given position;
3. the interpretation of selected messages from the perspective of participants in the political debate opposing a given position;
4. the identification of where discursive contentiousness and commonalities occur (cf. Piekot 2016: 81);
5. an attempt to identify the nature of the beliefs behind the messages examined and their interpretations based on an analysis of the socio-political context;

6. an attempt to identify discursive behaviours indicating the justification (legitimation) for taking specific political actions caused by beliefs manifested as well as their interpretations;
7. an attempt to identify mechanisms indicating the supremacy of the beliefs behind the messages examined as well as their interpretations regarding individual points of view and positions;
8. an attempt to identify discursive behaviours that distort and reduce the complexity of socio-political reality, distorting, to a greater or lesser extent, its actual image.

**Discursive ideological profiles of two main positions
in the dispute over the migration crisis
Analysis of the results of the author's research**

The humanitarian imperative

From the perspective of supporters of Polish participation in the relocation mechanism, the humanitarian imperative was an absolute priority. At the nominative-predicative level, they categorically stated that the 2015 migration crisis was one of the worst humanitarian crises in Europe, and even used more stylistically marked terms, calling it a great humanitarian disaster. This point, like the one concerning Poland's obligation to provide humanitarian aid in the present situation, was wholeheartedly accepted, often presupposed. Labels such as humanitarian problem or challenge were also used. Politicians mentioned the obligation to provide humanitarian aid, implement humanitarian policy, respect international humanitarian law and referred to the most important values, among which they mentioned humanitarianism. At the same time, statements were made that the challenge in question is not only humanitarian, but also political or economic, and in addition to fulfilling humanitarian duty, the crisis should be counteracted at its source. However, the humanitarian context was definitely in the foreground here.

As for the opponents of Polish participation in the relocation mechanism, they suggested that such a categorical reduction of the subject to a humanitarian context was naive and short-sighted. It was claimed that adults and healthy men predominated among the migrants, and that people who should be primarily targeted for humanitarian aid (such as women, children, and other vulnerable people) remained in their countries of origin. It was believed that the position represented by the supporters of Polish participation in the relocation

mechanism would lead to uncontrollable waves of fake refugees tempted by the promise of a better life. The legitimacy of humanitarian aid was not denied, but it was defined in a completely different way. It was recognised that this assistance should be provided in the migrants' countries of origin or in countries adjacent to these countries. At the same time, the humanitarian imperative was not as decisive as in the case of supporters, which was sometimes also manifested in the very order in which the arguments were presented. For example, helping refugees on the spot was presented both as more economically effective and, only later, more humane. Table 1 provides a detailed illustration of the discursive messages described.

As can be seen from the quotations cited, the humanitarian aspect of the crisis was important in declarations made by both sides, which can be treated as common ground where agreement could be sought. At the same time, the manner in which humanitarianism should be understood in that particular context was a discursive point of contention.

Reconstructing the ideological profile of supporters of Polish participation in implementing the relocation and resettlement mechanism, it can be concluded that in their view, humanitarianism should be the starting point and, at the same time, the determinant of all activities of the Polish state in this area. The importance of this factor, emphasised by numerous examples of hyperbole, was to justify political actions aimed at implementing the relocation mechanism. The suggested inclination of the other party to the dispute to disregard this aspect, and even that they were "scaring people with refugees and fuelling social fears along with selfish and nationalist attitudes" (P5) was supposed to delegitimise this party. Humanitarianism was presented here at the level of implicatures as a constitutive value defining the identity of the community not only by supporters of implementing the relocation mechanism by Poland, but it would seem, more broadly, of decent people who should help others. It was assumed to be the most important value along with empathy or readiness to share with those in need. It seems, therefore, that a certain perspective (framework) of humanitarianism was imposed here, which could simplify a more complex political analysis of participation by the Polish state in the implementation of the relocation mechanism and its international determinants and long-term political consequences. It could also hinder a broader view of the subject of the dispute, not only in terms of humanitarianism, but also in terms of legal, political, or international pragmatics. Relocation did not have to be the only possible humanitarian Polish response to the migration crisis. It can be recognised that it was a specific technical proposal to solve a humanitarian as well as a political problem, the results of which, both humanitarian

Table 1

*The humanitarian imperative in the Polish political debate on the migration crisis
(statements analysed)*

Proponents (P)	Opponents (O)
<p>Today, when we're talking about the greatest <u>humanitarian</u> crisis in Europe, perhaps since the creation of the European Union, this debate requires, above all, seriousness and competence (P1)</p> <p>the most accurate definition of this situation that has been given in the statements made so far, is contained in just three words, great <u>humanitarian</u> disaster (P2)</p> <p>what's most important is this <u>humanitarian</u> problem (P2)</p> <p>Today, there are over 300 million migrants in a world of 8 billion, Mr Żelichowski, not a world of 6 billion, and 10 times fewer refugees. And this is a huge challenge, on the one hand <u>humanitarian</u> and on the other political and this also touches on certain economic threads (P3)</p> <p>The Polish government has no clear plan about how to solve the crisis, which the Prime Minister rightly said was the greatest <u>humanitarian</u> crisis in modern Europe (P4)</p> <p>The greatest <u>humanitarian</u> crisis in modern Europe requires, and please understand this well, putting party politics to one side (P4)</p> <p>I also have no doubt that apart from <u>humanitarian</u> aid for refugees, Poland and the European Union must finally take urgent and decisive steps to eliminate the causes of the immigration crisis (P5)</p> <p>Instead of scaring people with refugees and fuelling social fears along with selfish and nationalist attitudes, the government should rather refer to the most important values upon which the Third Polish Republic is founded, to solidarity, which we are the cradle of, which we pride ourselves on abroad, to values such as <u>humanitarianism</u>, empathy and sharing with those in need (P5)</p> <p>do we comply with international <u>humanitarian</u> law, I'll go against the current here, since last year we've only granted 262 asylum permits? That is very little in relation to the number of those who have applied for it (P3)</p>	<p>It is one thing to help the mostly adult, healthy men who've come here, and another thing to help those who stayed behind. These are mostly women and children, who are much more at risk of rape, robbery, and torture. It would be much more economically efficient, much better from a <u>humanitarian</u> point of view, and at the same time it would reduce the influx of these people here (O1)</p> <p>It would be cheaper, much more <u>humanitarian</u>, and much more effective (O1)</p> <p>This huge wave of immigrants we are facing today was caused by an irresponsible statement by Chancellor Angela Merkel, who said nothing less than that the German government would accept all Syrians because they needed <u>humanitarian</u> aid. What happened after this statement? There has been a massive invasion across Europe's southern borders, and it turns out that all these people who are coming here, many hundreds of thousands of people, all of them say they are Syrians (O2)</p>

and political, were not at all obvious. Such a deterministic approach to the problem in terms of humanitarianism, disregarding the broader political context, undoubtedly hindered any more complex analysis and, paradoxically, even from the humanitarian point of view, it was not necessarily the most beneficial.

In reconstructing the ideological profile of opponents of Polish participation in the implementation of the relocation and resettlement mechanism, in this context the argument of humanitarianism was treated as one that distorted reality. Representatives of this side of the dispute were driven by a strong imperative to protect Poland's borders against waves of migration and defend it against threats to internal security (see below). Reducing the political problem of the migration crisis to the moral obligation to conduct humanitarian actions through relocation was treated as short-sighted, irresponsible and a threat to the aforementioned security. The obvious way out of the situation would be to provide humanitarian aid in the refugees' countries of origin. It was assumed that this would not only better protect the internal security of European countries, but also to be more humane (turning the tables; cf. Schopenhauer 1997: 86). However, it was the concern for security that was the main justification for the political action taken (see below). It seems that a certain perspective (framework) of "help on the ground" was imposed here, which could simplify more complex analyses of the humanitarian situation of refugees arriving in Europe. It was assumed in advance that the on-site assistance would be able to solve a complex problem although this was not necessary. The simplification of reality also consisted of generalisations that those migrating to Europe during the crisis were not those really in need of help. In this way, a psychological mechanism of rationalisation could be triggered, allowing for the elimination of cognitive dissonance that could arise in a situation where it was found that among the groups of migrants arriving there were also people really requiring assistance in European countries (even if they were not the majority). Even if, from a political point of view, the imperative to help on the ground and eliminate all factors attracting migrants was correct, there were already migrants and refugees in European countries who required immediate action from these countries and on-site assistance would not solve their problem. Hence, focusing solely on the imperative of "help on the spot", in accordance with the ideological assumptions adopted, could result in overlooking or, even without necessarily realising it, downplaying the tragedy of people who already found themselves in the incoming waves of migration.

The security imperative

The security imperative was an absolute priority for opponents of Polish participation in the relocation mechanism. They stated that participation by the Polish state in implementing this mechanism would have a negative impact on the country's internal security and therefore the government had no right to make such decisions against the will of the nation. In their view, the danger consisted in the assumed impossibility of distinguishing economic migrants from refugees, in the high probability of terrorists blending into the refugee community, as well as the initiation of a process that would result in the arrival of large groups posing a threat to Poland's legal, cultural, or moral order. In this context, the dangers associated with the mass influx of Muslims were particularly emphasised. Failure to take into account the threat to internal security understood in this way in the decision-making process was interpreted here as contrary to common sense. The assurances of the then Polish government that the security issue was under control were treated as completely unreliable.

As for the perspective of supporters of Polish participation in the implementation of the relocation mechanism, the dominant view was that fears in this regard were groundless. Assurances were made that security was an absolute priority for the government at the time, and that the state was able to cope with all the risks pointed out by its opponents. References were made to the previous experience of immigration to Poland, which was supposed to prove that the fears of political opponents were groundless. At the same time, these fears were described as fearmongering, that is intentionally stoking fears in society in order to achieve certain political goals. A detailed illustration of the described discursive messages is provided in Table 2.

As in the case of the humanitarian imperative, both sides in the debate agreed that security should be a key aspect of the country's policy regarding the migration crisis. The discursive place of contention was the probability of certain risks, as well as the country's readiness to counteract them.

When reconstructing the ideological profile of opponents of Polish participation in the implementation of the relocation and resettlement mechanism, the main threat was associated with the influx of large masses of people possessing different value systems (culturally distant, with the main threat here being Muslims), as well as (potential) terrorists. The main value was the defence of Polish society against specific threats, and the experience of other countries was given as proof of the existence of these threats. The protection of citizens was a sufficient reason for certain political actions and to indicate how dangerous the policy pursued by their political opponents was.

Table 2

The security imperative in the Polish political debate on the migration crisis (statements analysed)

Proponents (P)	Opponents (O)
<p>Let's remember the 1990s. In the 90s, when Poland was a much poorer country than it is now, we accepted 86,000 Chechens. Have you found terrorists on every street corner? Have you noticed a sudden drop in employment? Have you noticed any situations that would threaten the <u>security</u> of the Polish nation? (P1)</p> <p>Today we do not have to set up walls and barbed wire on our borders. Today our borders are <u>secure</u> (P1)</p> <p>we have a sense of responsibility for the <u>security</u> of the Polish public (P1)</p> <p>It is the duty of every (Polish) government, above all, to ensure the <u>security</u> of citizens who live in our country, to ensure the <u>security</u> of our compatriots. And if that is so, our next condition is, among other tasks, that we will verify those who come to us, they will be verified by our (security) services (P1)</p> <p>Don't frighten the Polish public today. Don't say that one fine day, before the elections, we will be flooded by a mass of refugees who will take jobs or possibly be <u>dangerous</u> to Polish citizens (P1)</p> <p>I would like to point out that in everything we do, security is the number one priority. That is why it is so important to be able to check and refuse to admit any person who could pose any kind of threat (P1)</p>	<p>does the government have the right, under foreign pressure, external pressure, and without the express consent of the nation, to make decisions that, with a high degree of probability, may have a negative impact on our lives, on our everyday reality, on our public life, on our public spaces, on our real sphere of freedom, and finally, as was also raised here, our <u>security</u> (O3)</p> <p>there is a serious <u>danger</u> that a process will be launched which, in a nutshell, will look like this, first the number of foreigners increases rapidly, then they do not comply, do not want to comply, declare that they will not comply with our laws, our customs... (O6)</p> <p>We can help refugees, but I repeat, in a way that is <u>safe</u> for the Polish public (O3)</p> <p>The Prime Minister and representatives of the Polish government based their entire narrative today on the information that Poland is <u>safe</u>, that the Islamic State poses no threat to us, that state services and institutions guarantee us full <u>security</u>. In that case, I'd like to ask a question. Just check it out. Please look at the United States. The United States in its last position clearly indicates that there will also be representatives of the Islamic State among the refugees (O4)</p> <p>Poland should behave like a reasonable Polish woman. Our <u>security</u>, our country, our home, our children. This is what is most important. So, I ask you, Madame Prime Minister, where did you lose your sense, your instinct for self-preservation? Why don't you act like a sensible woman today? (O5)</p> <p>Iraq, which has a huge intelligence network in that part of the country, Saudi Arabia and other countries are firmly saying: we will not accept even one immigrant. Why do they do that? Because they care about their own interests. How do they justify this? For reasons of <u>security</u>. It seems the Iraqi (security) services are unable to distinguish between a potential refugee and a potential terrorist (O5)</p>

	<p>How will the Polish state, which was also criticised by one of the former ministers, separate emigrants from refugees and terrorists? Do we have anything to fear? We do have something to fear. Let us recall what has been happening in Europe and in the world over the last 15 years. I state that the Polish state is currently unable to ensure the <u>security</u> of its own citizens (O2)</p>
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Source: *Sprawozdanie...* 2015.

This policy was associated with succumbing to foreign pressure and going against the will of the nation. Colourful hyperboles, metaphors or comparisons were used (for example, “Poland should behave like a reasonable Polish woman. Our security, our country, our home, our children. This is what is most important” (O5)). The domination of the security context marginalised the humanitarian context. Generalisations concerning the incoming migrants imposed a specific way of treating the migration problem, that is as an influx of groups of dangerous people, and not as people who, at least in part, should be offered international protection. Politicians representing this ideological profile saw the problem of the need for humanitarian aid, but they subordinated their point of view to the dominant perspective of threats to security. Even assuming that the security argument was accurate, such determinative contextualisation risked oversimplifying and distorting the real picture of migrant groups arriving in Europe. It also facilitated the rationalisation of not admitting people fleeing potential persecution.

The ideological profile of the supporters of Polish participation in the relocation and resettlement mechanism was based on a preconceived belief that fears regarding security were unjustified. This was evidenced by historical analogies. The cultural distance separating the arriving groups from European societies was ignored. Equating the indication of security threats with fearmongering was part of a certain ideological paradigm of political correctness, which stigmatised the association of migration with the issue of security understood in the way represented by their political opponents. When referring to the arguments of political opponents, irony and absurdity were utilised (“Have you found terrorists on every street corner?” (P1)), thus trivialising this line of argumentation. At the same time, security guarantees were formulated in a manner that was very categorical, rhetorical and at the same time verging on redundancy. This allowed for the justification of the chosen political line, and was also in line with the ideological assumptions adopted. In practice, this could result in ignoring facts indicating real security risks.

The Imperative of European Solidarity

From the perspective of supporters of Polish participation in the relocation mechanism, the imperative of European solidarity was no less important than the humanitarian imperative. In the debate under review, this matter took up much space in the statements of representatives of this side of the dispute. Poland's obligation towards the EU or other European countries with regard to participation in the relocation mechanism was taken for granted. This participation was to be an expression of solidarity with the EU and its individual states resulting from European treaties. On the one hand, it was sometimes noticed that this solidarity should have limits, but on the other hand it was treated as a kind of moral and axiomatic political given, which also in the context of the relocation mechanism, should not be discussed. Moreover, the solidarity described was sometimes identified with responsibility. On the one hand, the obligation to participate in the relocation mechanism was presented as resulting from Poland's historical debt (that is the fact that in the past Poland was the beneficiary of assistance from other European countries), and on the other hand, it was to be a guarantee of reciprocity in the event of a potential crisis that might affect Poland in the future. Therefore, this issue was also perceived in terms of the potential national interest of Poland.

As far as the perspective of opponents of Polish participation in the relocation mechanism is concerned, the issue of European solidarity was mentioned much less frequently in the debate and when it was mentioned it was mainly in response to points made by their opponents. Reference was made to the Christian principle of *ordo caritatis* (the order of love), according to which the interests of the closest communities should be taken care of first. The imperative of European solidarity was not denied, but it was argued that this solidarity should be implemented through a proportionate transfer of funds. It was stated that real solidarity consisted in solving the problem in solidarity, and not in deepening it, with the latter option being associated with activities that could attract further groups of migrants. In the context of historical arguments, it was pointed out that Western European countries have no moral legitimacy to instruct the Polish state on the observance of the principles of solidarity, as evidenced by the fate of Poland after World War II. With regard to the present, the political hypocrisy of countries such as Germany was also remarked upon, which in other matters, such as the unfavourable agreement with Russia regarding the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, did not attach so much importance to the value of European solidarity. The issue of solidarity was perceived rather in the context of supporting countries that, according to

politicians representing this side of the dispute, proposed a constructive solution to the problem of the migration crisis, such as Hungary. A detailed illustration of the described discursive messages is provided in Table 3.

As can be seen from the cited quotations, the parties to the dispute attached completely different levels of importance to the issue of European solidarity, and also defined this solidarity differently. It seems that this issue was the most distinct axis of the ideological dispute.

When reconstructing the ideological profile of supporters of Polish participation in the relocation and resettlement mechanism, it should be noted that the political perspective of European solidarity (based on treaties) was often confused with the perspective of duty and morality. The use of such conceptual categories as historical debt or obligation added an ideological colour to the dispute, which essentially concerned the legitimacy of a certain technical political solution. Pathos was often utilised, in the form of numerous modal verbs with strong normative charges (“we must”, “we should”), as well as markers of increased authoritativeness, such as “beyond doubt” (P8), etc. Ideals such as “the spirit of solidarity” or “the memory of solidarity”, which the Polish nation had supposedly encountered, were associated with the idea that Europe now “expects” the same kind of solidarity from Poland. This expectation was at the same time an automatic obligation to participate in the relocation mechanism. The issue of participation, based on solidarity, in the implementation of relocation was equated with responsibility, from which, as could be concluded, some Polish politicians wanted to “escape” (“no one will escape responsibility” (P16)). Thus it was a kind of declaration of relocation as being the obvious or only appropriate solution. The need to share the social costs of mass waves of immigration to Europe was assumed *a priori*, ignoring the fact that one of the factors attracting immigrants was the long-term immigration policy of Western European countries, shaped by processes in which Poland did not participate. They spoke not only of the need to bear the social costs of immigration in solidarity, but also about the need to stand up in solidarity against the voices of those opposed, who were often identified with xenophobic attitudes. Referring to the argument, which in negotiation theory is called the “reward in paradise” tactic, that is indicating that in the future, on the basis of reciprocity, Poland may also expect beneficial behaviour from the EU based on solidarity, suggested a rather utilitarian perception of the category of European solidarity. The gaps related to this solidarity in the behaviour of other countries in relations with Poland were not noticed; nor was the fact that the problem of immigration concerns mainly the countries of Western, Southern and Northern Europe, and not Central and Eastern Europe, that is even in the situation of intensifying migration along the

Table 3
The imperative of European solidarity in the Polish political debate on the migration crisis
(statements analysed)

Proponents (P)	Opponents (O)
<p>This must be a path that, on the one hand, will combine responsibility and common sense, and on the other hand, despite everything, will remember the <u>solidarity</u> that the Polish nation met when it needed it from its partners in the European Union (P1)</p> <p>We Poles could find ourselves in a difficult position at any time due to the dynamic situation in eastern Europe and eastern Ukraine. We would then expect help and <u>solidarity</u> with Poland when we need it. I want to assure you that, as in life, <u>solidarity</u> in politics is a two-way street. Today it is Europe and our partners in Europe who expect this <u>solidarity</u> from us (P1)</p> <p>After all, at any moment we could be threatened by an immigration crisis from the Ukrainian side, if the situation in Donbas worsens. We always mention this in our conversations in the European Union. From the very beginning, we have been repeating in every possible forum in the European Union that when it comes to the immigration crisis, we must be guided by the principles that, as Poland, we are able to show <u>solidarity</u> in the matter of refugees, that we want to, but comprehensive and responsible measures are needed in this matter (P6)</p> <p>No one can escape responsibility. Turning aside or turning our backs on our partners, from countries that today are the destination of immigration, that welcome those people who are in them, is contrary to the spirit of <u>solidarity</u>, but it can cost us the loss of <u>solidarity</u> in those issues that we care about the most (P6)</p> <p>We cannot passively wait while border controls are being strengthened in more countries and wait for the Schengen area and other foundations of European <u>solidarity</u> to be shaken. We should, as the European Union, but also Poland, and perhaps above all as Poland, take bold, comprehensive, and forward-looking steps that result from our initiative and vision, but also good will (P6)</p>	<p>(...) <i>ordo caritatis</i>, the order of mercy, the order of love. Within this principle, those closest come first, the family, then the nation and only then others. Does this principle imply that we should not help? No, ladies and gentlemen, we should help, we are definitely in favour of helping, but in a safe way, that is financially. It was mentioned here that it costs 2.8 billion dollars or that amount is still needed in order to maintain the camps from which we have this great outflow of people to Europe at the moment. Let's take on the part of the commitment that we should take given our share in the European Union's GDP. It is not high, and it will not be a huge sum, although it will be a significant sum. This will be real <u>solidarity</u>, and this will be the way to solve this problem (O3)</p> <p>And additionally, the German state and representatives of this state want to teach us <u>solidarity</u>. They keep telling us about <u>solidarity</u>. In that case, I would like to ask: "Where were these states, where was the West when Prime Minister Putin harassed us, the Republic of Poland? Well, you know the answer to that question. The West signed Nord Stream II four days ago. And I'm not talking about the West's <u>solidarity</u> with us that we know from history. Well, Honourable Chamber, one doesn't have to look far, the September campaign, the Warsaw Uprising, Yalta. We remember it all. And the fact that now the West wants to teach us <u>solidarity</u> is the height of insolence (O4)</p> <p>No illegal immigrants. This is the first demand. The second demand is real, true <u>solidarity</u> at the moment that means primarily <u>solidarity</u> with Hungary. If we want to maintain a common Europe, that which is valuable in a common Europe, that is the free movement of capital, the free movement of people, we must protect the Schengen borders. And this protection of Schengen borders requires Poland's support armed, military</p>

However, we are dealing with a different understanding of national interests, enlightened, as Tocqueville writes, by a well-understood national interest. If within a certain whole we are connected with others by certain relationships, relations and interdependencies, then sometimes it is good to restrain our excessive appetites and fears and respond positively to the rational claims, fears and demands of others, because the principle of reciprocity applies, *do ut des*, I give so that you give, the principle of transactional policy so criticised by you, Mister Chairman. *Do ut des*, I give so that you give, there is reciprocity in services, in solidarity, this is transactional policy (P10)

After all, Art. 78 sec. 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union says that we show solidarity not to refugees, refugees are the background, they are the circumstance, we show solidarity to other European Union countries that are flooded with refugees. On this matter, the Council, upon a request from the Commission, may take a decision and vote on it. There is no dictate here, no blackmail. We ratified the Lisbon Treaty and so we have it (P10)

Well, it's like this, Madam Prime Minister, because they have their limitations, the ministers said: "Okay, and when will the wave of emigration from the East come?" It is true, but there are other areas of concern, the issue of extending sanctions against Russia, which is painful for some Visegrad Group countries or for Germany. Then we can hear: "Okay, but why should we take more of your trouble than our trouble, when in our hour of need you refused to show us solidarity?" How does President Duda, if the principle of solidarity is broken, want to implement the Newport Plus plan at the Warsaw summit, to increase NATO's presence in Poland? (P10)

and police support in every respect. If the Polish border with Ukraine were equally threatened, it would be obvious that other European countries would help protect it, just as it should be obvious now to help Hungary, for the brave Hungarian nation in this situation of invasion (O6)

Poland is ready, in a spirit of solidarity, to undertake and responsibly organise measures agreed to under international obligations (P7)

Of course, solidarity is the most important thing, that is beyond doubt. The Polish government should show solidarity and already is showing solidarity. It is not about numbers, about three, six or nine thousand people, but above all it is about solidarity that is responsible and has a solid and credible basis (P8)

The solidarity that we must show in this difficult moment for Europe will be rational and responsible solidarity and in line with our real capabilities (P8)

Our European community must show solidarity on two levels. First, on the fundamental, most important level, that is, on the level of solidarity with refugees. Of course, both the principle of voluntary actions and the principle of a well-developed method for separating, distinguishing economic immigrants from real refugees, are important here. But the most important thing is this humanitarian problem. The second level of solidarity is intra-European solidarity, that is sharing both the responsibility and the costs of solving this problem together. Of course, I am not talking about financial costs here, but more about the social costs, because today we are witnessing, especially in the broadly understood public debate, very disturbing processes, an atmosphere of reluctance, unease and fear is growing, which we must also in solidarity oppose (P2)

I travel a lot and wherever I am I talk about Poland. Poland is known for being a country of solidarity, a hospitable country. I even dare say that it is Poland's most recognisable brand. Poland has always been known for offering refuge to persecuted people. But I also want to say that it is very easy to destroy this through fear or through irresponsible behaviour. A lack of solidarity with other European countries today may mean lack of solidarity from them tomorrow. Therefore, it is in our interest to show solidarity (P9)

Source: *Sprawozdanie...* 2015

Eastern European route, the problems of the destination countries of this migration would not change significantly enough to require action on their part. At the same time, these actions would not be an expression of European solidarity, but of the national interests of these countries. The debate also featured arguments which, from a political perspective, could be called demagogic. These consisted in recalling solidarity as a national value of Poland, or even suggesting a connection between the topic of the debate and the tradition of the “Solidarity” trade union. European solidarity in the statements of supporters of Polish participation in the relocation mechanism seemed to have the rank of an ideological dogma that did not allow for a more in-depth political analysis of the problem. Its broad, categorical, and obligatory definition made it very difficult for its supporters to notice the fact that other countries sometimes relativise this category, making its interpretation dependent on circumstances and interests. As Tomasz G. Grosse and Joanna Hetnarowicz wrote, at the European level, the idea of solidarity is “increasingly (...) treated as a rhetorical tool in the discourse (...) aimed at pursuing particular interests” (Grosse, Hetnarowicz 2017: 208). Such voices were overlooked here. However, a normative definition of the problem in terms of the imperative of European solidarity made it possible to justify Poland’s consent to participate in the relocation mechanism expressed by the then government.

When reconstructing the ideological profile of opponents of Polish participation in the relocation mechanism, it can be noticed that the issue of European solidarity was not an important issue for them. Here, too, references were made to moral or even religious categories referring to the social teachings of the Catholic Church and the principle of *ordo caritatis*, which can be treated as a kind of ideological declaration. For the supporters of relocation “European solidarity” and for the opponents “the order of love” were among the highest values, respectively. The perception of the category of solidarity by political opponents was considered extremely naive, and claims by European countries to solidarity on the part of Poland were described as “insolence” (O4). The category of solidarity was also redefined here, focusing on solidarity with Hungary, whose policy towards the migration crisis was in line with the beliefs of the opponents to relocation in Poland. Making use of such terms as “illegal immigrants” or “invasion”, it was suggested that European solidarity cannot consist of jointly consenting to an “invasion by illegal immigrants”, but should rather focus on jointly and decisively opposing mass, uncontrolled migration.

Commentary

The above analysis indicates the important role played by ideologies in the political discourse on the migration crisis. The main parties to the dispute referred to values and norms that were fundamental to them, while making inappropriate simplifications of reality. They displayed a “package” adoption of predetermined axiological and practical assumptions, sometimes treating identification with a given position as a matter of not only political, but, more broadly, of social identity. With regard to humanitarianism, preconceived definitions of the situation excluded the point of view of opponents, and at times delegitimised the other side of the dispute. This was facilitated by the rhetorical means used. Similarly, in relation to security, one party to the dispute seemed to downplay the problem, providing assurances regarding security, while the other side to some extent demonised the subject of the debate. As far as European solidarity is concerned, the supporters of Polish participation in the relocation mechanism seemed to approach this issue almost dogmatically in the context analysed, while opponents flagrantly ignored it. This progressive polarisation meant that although there were some common areas in the ongoing dispute, both parties gradually moved away from agreement and fell into inappropriate extremes with distorted pictures of reality. A strong, sometimes a priori, attachment to certain values, solutions, and political identifications, as well as a focus on repelling attacks by political opponents, prevented a more thorough, more factual analysis of the situation, free of inappropriate simplifications. Meanwhile, if the parties had been focused on the possibility of reaching an agreement, there would have been space for substantive discussion, especially in relation to issues such as humanitarianism and security. Both sides emphasised the importance of these issues in their politics. However, there was definitely no openness to the other side’s arguments, and the parties became entrenched in their positions.

It seems that in the case of both sides of the dispute, there were circumstances conducive to groupthink, and the participants of the debate were inclined to formulate more radical statements, declare impossible guarantees, or automatically rationalise actions that could give rise to moral dilemmas. The collective impact of certain political ideologies containing an identarian element resulted in a reductionist radicalisation of positions in the dispute, which at the individual level representatives of both positions would probably not allow themselves to such an extent.

Conclusion

Summarising the findings regarding the first research question formulated in the introduction to the article, that is the main ideological assumptions present in the statements of supporters and opponents of Polish participation in the relocation and resettlement mechanism in 2015, the following assumptions adopted *en bloc* by supporters of this solution can be noted:

- an attitude of social openness to migrants should be promoted, and manifestations of fear of immigration should be stigmatised and eliminated from political discourse;
- the reduction of the migration issue to concerns about security, threats and control is not justified and should be stigmatised and eliminated from political discourse;
- accepting migrants in European countries is associated with a moral obligation of richer societies towards poorer societies and the obligation to treat others in a humane manner;
- among migrants, refugees or, more broadly, those seeking international protection there is a group that absolutely requires support, so these groups should be treated with particular care;
- European integration is the central value of contemporary European states, and “selfishly” understood national interests should not overshadow this value; therefore, a policy should be pursued that strongly takes arrangements adopted at the supranational level into account;
- the immigration problems of other European countries are also becoming a problem for Poland (as a member of the EU) and therefore Poland is obliged to show solidarity with these countries through real actions, such as accepting migrants under the relocation mechanism.

Among the ideological assumptions adopted *en bloc* by opponents of this solution, the following can be mentioned:

- immigration is a neutral process, which means in certain circumstances it can be positive, and in others negative and can even pose a threat to the receiving country, and therefore in certain socio-political circumstances (such as the migration crisis), a morally and politically justified, and even a strong and openly declared defence against an influx of immigrants is necessary;
- mass migration is associated with specific threats of various types (social, cultural, criminal, etc.) for the host countries, which must be counteracted, and therefore migration should be perceived and analysed through the prism of domestic national security and should even be subordinated to it;

- national identity, national sovereignty and national interests are the central values of any country and society and they should not be overruled by any supranational arrangements or ideas of European solidarity since the state is obliged to treat its own defence as a priority;
- among migrants, the group that requires priority support consists of refugees, or more broadly people seeking international protection, so special care should be taken with these groups, but decisions in this regard should be conditioned by care for the domestic security of the accepting country;
- migration is not a remedy for global, regional, or local socio-political problems, including those that generate refugees; therefore, potential forced migrants should be helped, but not through support for migration, but through assistance provided in their countries of origin.

Referring to the second research question concerning the risk of falsifying (distorting) the image of reality by the ideological beliefs of the participants in the debate, it should be noted that the parties assumed the correctness of the solutions they proposed *a priori* and adopted unambiguous and categorical definitions of the situation. For example, it was assumed in advance that relocation could be the only humanitarian solution (proponents), or that only on-the-spot assistance could solve the migration crisis (opponents). On the one hand, security threats related to relocation were underestimated and, as it appears, guarantees without coverage for this security were formulated by proponents. On the other hand, the problem of threats was exaggerated by opponents, who used unsupported generalisations regarding the incoming groups. With regard to European solidarity, on the one hand, the political and moral perspectives were mixed, regardless of its broader political context and the fact that participation in the relocation mechanism by Poland does not have to be the only solution in line with the principle of solidarity (proponents). On the other hand, this idea was dismissed with an indication that relocation and resettlement were inadequate (opponents). Thus, the recipient of the debate received an extremely polarised picture of the problem and two extreme variants of perceiving reality, while the reality was more complex.

Referring to the third research question, both parties in the dispute used various rhetorical and eristic techniques to impose their ideological beliefs on public opinion and their political opponents. The categorical nature of the messages was reinforced by emphasising their “obviousness” and the use of colourful metaphors, comparisons, irony, and hyperbole. Many opinions were presented as presuppositionally uncontested, as illustrated by the quotes from the debate presented earlier. On the one hand, it was stated, in a way that did

not allow criticism, that the consent of the Polish government to participate in the relocation mechanism was a necessary consequence of the supreme imperative of humanitarianism or European solidarity as superior values. The other party claimed that Poland's consent to participate in the relocation mechanism was an action taken against the Polish nation, violating one of the highest values that the state should protect, that is security. Neither side wanted to see the weakness of their arguments. It seems that for the supporters of the relocation mechanism, the complexity of reality has been obscured by the superior imperatives of humanitarianism and European solidarity, while for the opponents of this mechanism reality was obscured by the imperative of security. It is difficult to say to what extent the ideological reference to these values was deeply axiologically based, and to what extent it was treated in an instrumental manner by politicians.

To summarise, it should be emphasised that every policy is ideological and the very idea of ideology as such should not be pejorative. However, it is necessary to be aware of the risks associated with the influence of ideology on political debate, so that it can be controlled at least to some extent. This article proposes a theoretical and methodological clarification of the category of ideology and presents a sample of research on public debate conducted using the mediation approach of discourse analysis. This method made it possible to minimise the impact of the researcher's involvement on the analysis (as is the case, for example, in critical discourse analysis) and made it possible, in an imperfect, but, it would seem, clear way to extract the main ideological assumptions present in the Polish debate on the migration crisis. One limitation of the study was, despite the research methodology applied, the inability to fully eliminate the subjectivity of the researcher when justifying the qualification of certain messages as being ideologically motivated. Despite attempts to specify the concept of ideology and the exact characteristics of the research procedure, the category of ideology has still not been fully grasped, which significantly hindered its operationalisation. These shortcomings are compensated to some extent by the transparency of the research methodology, including extensive reference to the source material and justification of the interpretations proposed. Ultimately, therefore, readers can compare the author's interpretations and classifications with their own perspectives to perceive the issues under consideration.

Despite the weaknesses described, usage of the semiotic mediation approach is to be recommended in analyses of political discourse, especially concerning such problems as the migration crisis. The ideologically charged disputes that appear in the sphere of Polish political debate since 2015 still indicate the relevance of the problem, and even testify to the increasing role of the Polish state

in managing social and political crises related to the influx of migrants in the perspective of the entire EU. The essential role of Poland in managing migration became particularly visible after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, as a result of which Poland became the main country receiving war refugees from Ukraine. However, this role has been very significant since at least 2021, when attempts were made to destabilise the socio-political situation of the EU through intentionally triggered migration waves on the Polish-Belarusian border. As a side note, it should be noted that, especially from the Polish perspective, these issues have completely different contexts and are different in nature than the dispute over the 2015 migration crisis, which is the subject of this article. The approach, the elements of which have been used here, allows for a more complete and, to some extent, controlled analysis of the issues raised from various points of view and with the preservation of the right of various parties to a political dispute to proclaim their own ideological beliefs. In addition, at the same time it can be used to identify threats related to the influence of ideology on the political debate.

Politicians quoted in the study	
P1	Ewa Kopacz, Prime Minister
P2	Rafał Grupiński, MP
P3	Tadeusz Iwiński, MP
P4	Andrzej Rozenek, MP
P5	Wanda Nowicka, MP
P6	Grzegorz Schetyna, Minister of Foreign Affairs
P7	Teresa Piotrowska, Minister of the Interior
P8	Rafał Trzaskowski, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
P9	John Abraham Godson, MP
P10	Ludwik Dorn, MP

O1	Łukasz Gibała, MP
O2	Marzena Dorota Wróbel, MP
O3	Jarosław Kaczyński, MP
O4	Patryk Jaki, MP
O5	Armand Kamil Ryfiński, MP
O6	Przemysław Wipler, MP

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Keywords: migration crisis, relocation, political discourse, ideology, political debate, discourse analysis, semiotic mediation.

ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to reconstruct the main ideological assumptions present in the Polish political debate about the migration crisis in Europe in 2015. The article also poses research questions about the extent to which the ideological beliefs manifested by the participants in the debate posed a risk of distorting reality, as well as questions about the ways in which specific ideological beliefs were imposed on the public and political opponents. The main method used in the article is a qualitative discourse analysis based on elements of the mediation approach proposed by Tomasz Piekot. The identification of the main ideological assumptions present in linguistic political messages was conducted taking into account the generalised division between supporters and opponents of Polish participation in the relocation and resettlement mechanism established in 2015 at the forum of the European Union. The analysis was based on theoretical considerations concerning the concept of ideology, as well as the relationships between politics, ideologies, language, and political debate. The analysis shows that in the case of both of the principal sides of the political dispute on the topic addressed, there were simplifications, generalisations, metaphors and examples of hyperbole distorting the picture of reality caused by ideological assumptions. Both supporters and opponents of relocation and resettlement utilised ideologically motivated instrumental linguistic behaviours in order to achieve their assumed political goal. The issue of Polish participation in the relocation mechanism was automatically and excessively simplified by attempts to identify it with such issues as humanitarianism, security, and European solidarity.

